diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/Cargo.toml b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..19cc2447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+[package]
+name = "qos_p256_fuzz"
+version = "0.0.0"
+publish = false
+edition = "2021"
+
+[package.metadata]
+cargo-fuzz = true
+
+[dependencies]
+libfuzzer-sys = "0.4"
+arbitrary = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+
+qos_p256 = { path = "../"}
+
+# Prevent this from interfering with workspaces
+[workspace]
+members = ["."]
+
+[profile.release]
+debug = 1
+# enable integer overflow checks
+overflow-checks = true
+
+[features]
+# feature used by some harnesses to signal a special mode, does nothing on other targets
+fuzzer_corpus_seed1 = []
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "1_sign_then_verify"
+path = "fuzz_targets/1_sign_then_verify.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "2_public_sign_key_round_trip"
+path = "fuzz_targets/2_public_sign_key_round_trip.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "3_public_sign_key_import"
+path = "fuzz_targets/3_public_sign_key_import.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "4_public_key_import"
+path = "fuzz_targets/4_public_key_import.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "5_basic_encrypt_decrypt"
+path = "fuzz_targets/5_basic_encrypt_decrypt.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "6_basic_encrypt_decrypt_aesgcm"
+path = "fuzz_targets/6_basic_encrypt_decrypt_aesgcm.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "7_decrypt_aesgcm"
+path = "fuzz_targets/7_decrypt_aesgcm.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "8_decrypt_p256"
+path = "fuzz_targets/8_decrypt_p256.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "9_decrypt_shared_secret"
+path = "fuzz_targets/9_decrypt_shared_secret.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/1_sign_then_verify.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/1_sign_then_verify.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3657ebe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/1_sign_then_verify.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+use qos_p256::sign::P256SignPair;
+use qos_p256::P256Pair;
+use std::{convert::TryFrom, iter};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	key: [u8; qos_p256::MASTER_SEED_LEN],
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+// this harness is based on the sign_and_verification_works() unit test
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+	// let the fuzzer control the key and data that is going to be signed
+
+	let keypair = match P256Pair::from_master_seed(&input.key) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+	let input_data: &[u8] = &input.data.clone();
+
+	// produce a signature over the data input the fuzzer controls
+	let signature = keypair.sign(input_data).unwrap();
+
+	// verify the just-generated signature
+	// this should always succeed
+	assert!(keypair.public_key().verify(input_data, &signature).is_ok());
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/2_public_sign_key_round_trip.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/2_public_sign_key_round_trip.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ed4dccb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/2_public_sign_key_round_trip.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+use qos_p256::sign::P256SignPair;
+use qos_p256::sign::P256SignPublic;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	key: [u8; qos_p256::MASTER_SEED_LEN],
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+// this harness is based on the public_key_round_trip_bytes_works() unit test
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+	// Let the fuzzer pick a P256 key
+	let keypair = match P256SignPair::from_bytes(&input.key) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+	// create valid signature
+	let signature = keypair.sign(&input.data).unwrap();
+
+	// derive public key and export it to bytes
+	let bytes_public = keypair.public_key().to_bytes();
+
+	// re-import public key from bytes
+	// this should always succeed
+	let public_reimported = P256SignPublic::from_bytes(&bytes_public)
+		.expect("We just generated and exported this pubkey");
+
+	assert!(keypair.public_key().verify(&input.data, &signature).is_ok());
+	// expect the signature verification with the reconstructed pubkey to always succeed
+	assert!(public_reimported.verify(&input.data, &signature).is_ok());
+
+    let mut wrong_signature = signature.clone();
+    let wrong_signature_last_element_index = wrong_signature.len() - 1;
+    // flip a bit in the signature
+    wrong_signature[wrong_signature_last_element_index] = wrong_signature[wrong_signature_last_element_index] ^ 1;
+    // expect the verification to fail since the signature is bad
+    assert!(public_reimported.verify(&input.data, &wrong_signature).is_err());
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/3_public_sign_key_import.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/3_public_sign_key_import.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f41f2c3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/3_public_sign_key_import.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+use qos_p256::sign::P256SignPublic;
+
+// this harness is partially based on the public_key_round_trip_bytes_works() unit test
+// it is a simpler variant of another public key import harness
+
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+	// let the fuzzer control the P256 signing pubkey
+
+	// import public key from bytes, silently exit in case of errors
+	let pubkey_special = match P256SignPublic::from_bytes(data) {
+		Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+	// we don't have the private key that belongs to this public key,
+	// so we can't generate valid signatures
+	// however, we can check the behavior against bad signatures
+
+	// static plaintext message
+	let message = b"a message to authenticate";
+	// dummy signature full of zeroes
+	let bad_signature = vec![0; 64];
+	// this should never succeed
+	assert!(pubkey_special.verify(message, &bad_signature).is_err());
+
+    let re_exported_public_key_data = pubkey_special.to_bytes();
+    // the exported data doesn't actually have to be identical to initial input,
+    // since P256SignPublic::from_bytes() accepts compressed points as well
+    // 
+    // workaround: compare only the 32 data bytes corresponding to the first sub-point,
+    // ignoring the first format byte and any trailing data
+    assert_eq!(data[1..33], re_exported_public_key_data[1..33]);
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/4_public_key_import.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/4_public_key_import.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dab66e01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/4_public_key_import.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzzer_corpus_seed1")]
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_mutator;
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzzer_corpus_seed1")]
+use qos_p256::P256Pair;
+use qos_p256::P256Public;
+
+// this helps the fuzzer over the major obstacle of learning what a valid P256Public object looks like
+#[cfg(feature = "fuzzer_corpus_seed1")]
+fuzz_mutator!(|data: &mut [u8], size: usize, max_size: usize, _seed: u32| {
+	// this is random and does not depend on the input
+	let random_key_pair = P256Pair::generate().unwrap();
+
+	let mut public_bytes = random_key_pair.public_key().to_bytes();
+	let public_bytes_length = public_bytes.len();
+
+	// this mutates the generated data in-place in its buffer
+	// and denies buffer length extensions, which is overly restrictive
+	let _mutated_data_size = libfuzzer_sys::fuzzer_mutate(
+		&mut public_bytes,
+		public_bytes_length,
+		public_bytes_length,
+	);
+
+	// calculate the new requested output size and return the corresponding data
+	let new_size = std::cmp::min(max_size, public_bytes_length);
+	data[..new_size].copy_from_slice(&public_bytes[..new_size]);
+	new_size
+});
+
+// this harness is partially based on the public_key_round_trip_bytes_works() unit test
+
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+	// let the fuzzer control the P256 signing pubkey and P256 encryption pubkey
+
+	// the fuzzer has problems synthesizing a working input without additional help
+	// see fuzz_mutator!() for a workaround
+
+	// import public keys from bytes
+	// silently exit in case of errors
+	let pubkey_special = match P256Public::from_bytes(data) {
+		Ok(pubkey) => pubkey,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+	// we don't have the private key that belongs to this public key,
+	// so we can't generate valid signatures
+	// however, we can check the behavior against bad signatures
+
+	// static plaintext message
+	let message = b"a message to authenticate";
+	// dummy signature full of zeroes
+	let bad_signature = vec![0; 64];
+	// this should never succeed
+	assert!(pubkey_special.verify(message, &bad_signature).is_err());
+
+	let re_exported_public_key_data = pubkey_special.to_bytes();
+	assert_eq!(data, re_exported_public_key_data);
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/5_basic_encrypt_decrypt.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/5_basic_encrypt_decrypt.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7aa0ac69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/5_basic_encrypt_decrypt.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+use qos_p256::encrypt::P256EncryptPair;
+
+// this harness is partially based on the basic_encrypt_decrypt_works() unit test
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	key: [u8; qos_p256::MASTER_SEED_LEN],
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+    // let the fuzzer control a message plaintext that is encrypted and then decrypted again
+    
+    // private key generation is non-deterministic: not ideal
+    let key_pair = match P256EncryptPair::from_bytes(&input.key) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+    let public_key = key_pair.public_key();
+    let data = input.data.to_vec();
+
+    // the encryption is non-deterministic due to the internal random nonce generation
+    // not ideal, can't be avoided due to API structure?
+    let serialized_envelope = public_key.encrypt(&data[..]).unwrap();
+
+    // expected to always succeed
+    let decrypted_data = key_pair.decrypt(&serialized_envelope).unwrap();
+
+    // check roundtrip data consistency, assert should always hold
+    assert_eq!(decrypted_data, data);
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/6_basic_encrypt_decrypt_aesgcm.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/6_basic_encrypt_decrypt_aesgcm.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..950d5925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/6_basic_encrypt_decrypt_aesgcm.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+use qos_p256::encrypt::AesGcm256Secret;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	key: [u8; qos_p256::MASTER_SEED_LEN],
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+// this harness is partially based on the encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() unit test
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+	// let the fuzzer control a message plaintext that is encrypted and then decrypted again
+
+	// private key generation is non-deterministic: not ideal
+	// let random_key = AesGcm256Secret::generate();
+	let random_key = match AesGcm256Secret::from_bytes(input.key) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+	let data = input.data.to_vec();
+
+	// the encryption is non-deterministic due to the internal random nonce generation
+	// not ideal, can't be avoided due to API structure?
+	// expected to always succeed
+	let encrypted_envelope = random_key.encrypt(&data[..]).unwrap();
+
+	// expected to always succeed
+	let decrypted_data = random_key.decrypt(&encrypted_envelope).unwrap();
+	// check roundtrip data consistency, assert should always hold
+	assert_eq!(decrypted_data, data);
+
+	let mut corrupted_encrypted_envelope = encrypted_envelope.clone();
+	let last_element_index_envelope = corrupted_encrypted_envelope.len() - 1;
+	// flip one bit in the end of the message as a simple example of data corruption
+	corrupted_encrypted_envelope[last_element_index_envelope] =
+		corrupted_encrypted_envelope[last_element_index_envelope] ^ 1;
+	// expect detection of the corruption
+	assert!(random_key.decrypt(&corrupted_encrypted_envelope).is_err());
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/7_decrypt_aesgcm.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/7_decrypt_aesgcm.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e5b3af4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/7_decrypt_aesgcm.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+use qos_p256::encrypt::AesGcm256Secret;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	key: [u8; 32], // AES256_KEY_LEN == 32
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+// this harness is partially based on the encrypt_decrypt_round_trip() unit test
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+	// let the fuzzer control a message plaintext that is encrypted and then decrypted again
+
+	// private key generation is non-deterministic: not ideal
+	// let random_key = AesGcm256Secret::generate();
+	let key = match AesGcm256Secret::from_bytes(input.key) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+    // we expect this to fail
+    match key.decrypt(&input.data) {
+        Ok(_res) => panic!("the fuzzer can't create valid AEAD protected encrypted messages"),
+        Err(_err) => {
+            return; 
+        },
+    };
+});
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/8_decrypt_p256.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/8_decrypt_p256.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2f8dcc74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/8_decrypt_p256.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+use qos_p256::encrypt::P256EncryptPair;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	key: [u8; qos_p256::MASTER_SEED_LEN],
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+	let key = match P256EncryptPair::from_bytes(&input.key) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+
+	// let the fuzzer control an encrypted message ciphertext to test decrypt() robustness
+	match key.decrypt(&input.data) {
+		Ok(_res) => panic!(
+			"the fuzzer should be unable to create a validly signed encrypted message"
+		),
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+});
diff --git a/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/9_decrypt_shared_secret.rs b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/9_decrypt_shared_secret.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7a2f107b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/qos_p256/fuzz/fuzz_targets/9_decrypt_shared_secret.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+// use qos_p256::encrypt::P256EncryptPair;
+use qos_p256::encrypt::P256EncryptPublic;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, arbitrary::Arbitrary)]
+pub struct FuzzKeyDataStruct {
+	public: Box<[u8]>, // this should be 65 byte in theory, but both 33 and 65 byte work
+	secret: Box<[u8]>,
+	data: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+fuzz_target!(|input: FuzzKeyDataStruct| {
+	let pubkey = match P256EncryptPublic::from_bytes(&input.public) {
+		Ok(pair) => pair,
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+	
+	match pubkey.decrypt_from_shared_secret(&input.secret, &input.data) {
+		Ok(_res) => panic!(
+			"the fuzzer should be unable to create a validly signed encrypted message"
+		),
+		Err(_err) => {
+			return;
+		}
+	};
+});